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Abstract. We have in an earlier study proposed a set of requirements and an 
approach to identification and modelling of cybersecurity risks and their impacts 
on safety, within the context of smart power grids. The approach, which consisted 
of a process and a modelling language, was a partially customized version of the 
existing "CORAS" risk-analysis approach. As a part of the study, feasibility of 
the approach was evaluated by applying it on an industrial pilot for so-called self-
healing functionality of a smart power grid. The results obtained were promising, 
but further empirical evaluation was strongly needed in order to further assess 
usefulness and applicability of the approach in the context of smart power grids. 
This paper provides a detailed account of results of applying the same approach 
to cybersecurity risk identification and modelling in the context of another smart 
grid pilot, namely digital secondary substations. The trial was conducted in a real 
setting, in the form of an industrial case study, in close collaboration with the 
major Norwegian distribution system operator that has been running the pilot for 
about two years. The evaluation indicates that the approach can be applied in a 
re-al setting to identify and model cybersecurity risks. The experiences from the 
case study moreover show that the presented approach is, to a large degree, well 
suited for its intended purpose, but it also points to areas in need for improvement 
and further evaluation. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Digital Substations, Cyber Risk, Smart Power Grids, 
Risk Identification, Risk Analysis, Risk modelling.     
1 Introduction  
Power grids are being increasingly digitalized, thanks to the evolving maturity and 
availability of the information and communication technologies (ICT). The digitaliza-
tion of the electric power grids will include new concepts based on intelligent sensors 
in the grid and efficient communication between these sensors and the Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system or distribution management system 
(DMS) [3]. The modern electric power grids adopting the technologies such as new 
communication networks, software, hardware, and control systems, are denoted as 
"Smart Grids". The goal of the energy providers and distributors is to utilize the digi-
talization in order to meet the needs for flexibility and efficiency of the power grid. 
Those needs are primarily driven by new power intensive loads due to, for example, 
This is the accepted version of an article published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 12026 
http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41568-6_2
2 
electric vehicle charging, thus increasing the peak power demand along with the sim-
ultaneous penetration of stochastic renewable energy sources. In this setting, it is cru-
cial to preserve the resilience of such a critical infrastructure that the power grid repre-
sents. However, the smart grids are not only enabling better utilization of the power 
grids, but also increasing complexity of the systems, thus introducing new kinds of 
risks, including the so-called cybersecurity risks (also known as digital risks). The cy-
bersecurity risks may also lead to risks impacting security of power supply. One exam-
ple of how adversaries can exploit the new components and technologies, is the cyber-
attack against the Ukrainian Power Grid in December 2015, where the outages affected 
approximately 225 000 customers that lost power across various areas [16]. 
By adding functionality to the power grids, ICT systems also contribute to un-
wanted incidents. Tøndel et Al. [22] argue that power grid reliability will increasingly 
depend on ICT components and systems. They also claim that the current methods for 
risk analysis of power systems seem unable to take into account the full array of inten-
tional and accidental threats. In addition, they found few methods and publications on 
identification of interdependencies between the ICT and power system. The objective 
of this research has been to provide support for cybersecurity risk analysis that takes 
into account the specific characteristics of smart power grids and meets the distinct 
needs within this domain. 
A major challenge of the power domain is that the smart grid solutions have 
been in operation for a very limited period of time. Since the emerging solutions are at 
their early stages, there is a lack of historical data and operational experiences that could 
constitute relevant input to the risk models. This uncertainty due to lack of knowledge 
makes it extremely difficult to identify or predict the unwanted incidents that may occur 
in the future. Instead, one must focus on identification of the known vulnerabilities that 
are introduced due to the increasing usage of ICT technologies and their interdepend-
encies with the physical power grid. However, the traditional risk analysis approaches 
often pre-assume that the nature and impact of the unwanted incidents are known, by 
demanding specific information on event description and risk quantification. Risk mod-
elling, that is, the modelling of what can go wrong [17], is a technique for risk identifi-
cation and assessment. 
With respect to the state-of-the-art, several tree-based and graph-based notations 
within risk modelling exist. Fault Tree Analysis [9], Event Tree Analysis [10] and At-
tack Trees [21] are examples of the former and provide support for reasoning about the 
sources and consequences of unwanted incidents, as well as their likelihoods. Cause-
Consequence Analysis [19], CORAS [17], and Bayesian networks [4] are examples of 
graph-based notations. CORAS is a tool-supported and model-driven approach to risk 
analysis that is based on the ISO 31000 risk management standard [13]. It uses diagrams 
as a means for communication, evaluation and assessment. Markov models [11], 
CRAMM [2], OCTAVE [1], Threat Modelling [18] and a number of others, have also 
been applied to support risk analysis. A framework for studying vulnerabilities and risk 
in the electricity supply, based on the bow-tie model, has been developed and is pub-
lished for instance in [14, 15, 8]. 
From a risk analysis perspective smart power grids are characterized by their 
inherent uncertainties due to both the stochastic nature of generation and load as well 
as an increased complexity giving rise to new risks which are introduced through the 
ICT part of the system. Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of such systems poses 
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requirements on comprehensibility of the design of smart power grids and the corre-
sponding risk models. Hence, a smart grid setting which includes a complex and critical 
cyber physical system, human in the loop, uncertainty due to lack of knowledge, many 
dependencies and interdisciplinary aspects, challenges the state-of-the-art on cyberse-
curity management. In an ideal setting, the risk model can be presented to human in a 
suitable interface, thereby serving as a useful support for decision making during design 
and operation. However, as they stand, none of the existing approaches provides the 
support that takes into account the specific characteristics of smart power grids and 
meets the distinct needs for cybersecurity risk analysis within this domain. This indi-
cates a need for an approach to cybersecurity risk identification which is customized to 
address the following requirements (the ordering is arbitrary and does not express the 
relative importance of the requirements):  
1. The approach is cost-effective and light-weight, i.e. the benefits of using it are well worth 
the effort. In particular, the value of gaining the decision support through applying the ap-
proach, should significantly outweigh the effort needed. 
2. The cyber risk model can be developed and easily understood by the involved actors who 
represent varying roles and background.  
3. The risk model has sufficient expressive power to capture relevant aspects of the cyberse-
curity risk picture in the context of smart power grids. 
4. The risk model facilitates inclusion of the information that is available, while not requesting 
unrealistic degree of precision.  
5. The risk model can visualize the cybersecurity relevant dependencies and sequence of 
states/events both for the whole context and for the detailed parts of the scope of analysis. 
This implies the ability of the modelling approach to both address a sufficiently broad scope, 
as well as to express the necessary details.   
We have in an earlier study [20] introduced the above listed requirements to a 
risk analysis and modelling approach in the context of smart electric power distribution 
grids. Based on these requirements, this earlier study proposed a customized four-step 
approach to cybersecurity risk identification and modelling. The feasibility of the ap-
proach was evaluated on an industrial pilot for so-called self-healing functionality of a 
smart grid. The approach, which consisted of a process and a modelling language, was, 
to a high degree, based on parts of the previously mentioned CORAS method for model-
based risk analysis. Compared to CORAS, the process and the modelling approach we 
have applied are simplified and partially adapted. The results obtained were promising. 
However, the need for more empirical evaluation in order to further assess usefulness 
of the approach, was evident. The original requirements to the approach and the ap-
proach itself, were therefore suggested to still be relevant and applicable for the next 
trial, i.e. the study reported in this paper.  
This paper provides a detailed account of results of applying the abovemen-
tioned previously proposed approach to cybersecurity risk identification and modelling 
in the context of another smart distribution grid pilot, namely an operational pilot on 
digital secondary substations. The trial was conducted in a fully realistic setting, in the 
form of an industrial case study, in close collaboration with a major Norwegian power 
distribution system operator (DSO) owning the digital secondary substations, which 
were commissioned in the period 2016 - 2019. The evaluation indicates that the ap-
proach can be usefully applied in a realistic setting to identify and model cybersecurity 
risks. The experiences from the case study moreover show that the presented approach 
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is, to a large degree, well suited for its intended purpose, but it also points to areas in 
need for improvement and further evaluation.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briefly present the 
research strategy applied. Our approach for cybersecurity risk identification and mod-
elling is presented in Section 3. The setup and the results from the trial of the approach 
are outlined in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the results, before concluding in Sec-
tion 6. 
2 Research Strategy  
The research strategy applied is in line with the design science approach [23], and fol-
lows the three steps illustrated in Figure 1. Although Figure 1 illustrates sequential 
steps, the research strategy was followed iteratively where some of the steps were re-
visited during the process. In Step 1, the goal was to identify the requirements for a risk 
identification and modelling approach that addresses the specific characteristics of the 
smart grid domain.  In Step 2, the goal was to develop a customized approach with 
respect to the requirements identified in Step 1. Based on the state-of-the-art overview 
and the lessons learned from the above-mentioned previous trial of the approach, the 
original five requirements and the approach that were identified and proposed in the 
previous study, were deemed to still be relevant and applicable. The requirements are 
listed in Section 1, while the approach containing four phases is presented in Section 3.  
Finally, in Step 3 of the research strategy, we evaluated the approach in an industrial 
setting together with a DSO (i.e. the power distribution system operator that was the 
use case provider) that is currently operating a pilot on digital secondary substations in 
their power grid. The evaluation was carried out as follows: First, we established the 
context and gained a deep understanding of the digital secondary substations, based on 
reports on state of the practice, dialogue with domain experts who participated in the 
analysis group, as well as the documentation provided by the DSO. Then, the modelling 
approach was introduced by the analyst to the domain experts from the DSO. Thereaf-
ter, the analyst proposed a preliminary version of the risk model which focused on cy-
bersecurity aspects of reliable energy supply. The preliminary version of the risk model 
was thereafter revised through several iterations, in close collaboration between the an-
alyst and the domain experts. Once no more of the context documentation or brain-
storming in the analysis group was needed for further modelling, a tool (checklist) for 
IoT security from ENISA [6] was proposed by the analyst and reviewed by the DSO, 
resulting in a new and complete version of the risk model. Lastly, a verification of the 
risk model was performed by the DSO putting forward a set of independently developed 
Figure 1. Research strategy. 
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risk scenarios (originating from a former risk analysis of a similar context, which had 
been performed independently from ours). The scenarios were then exposed to the risk 
model in order to seek needs for updates. The model was reviewed against the scenarios 
during a workshop with the analysis group and two additional domain experts from the 
DSO who had not been involved in the previous steps of the analysis. The independence 
of the brought risk scenarios and the two new domain experts, were a means of strength-
ening the reliability of the validation step. The complete evaluation process, as well as 
the outcomes of it, are presented in Section 4. 
3 Approach to Cybersecurity Identification and Modelling  
Our approach to cybersecurity risk identification and modelling has been previously 
proposed and presented in Omerovic et Al. [20]. The description of the approach is a 
core baseline for understanding contents of the trial. Hence, this section contains nearly 
the same generic description of the approach as the one given in the original source (i.e. 
the paper reporting on the aforementioned previous study), in order to enable the audi-
ence to read this paper independently from the former one. The approach consists of 
four main phases, inspired by the CORAS method and modelling language, but simpli-
fied and customized in order to address our specific requirements listed in Section 1. 
Our approach is assumed to be carried out by an analysis group, consisting of analysts 
and domain experts, representing competence in risk analysis, cybersecurity, and smart 
power grids. One individual may cover one or more roles, and several individuals may 
represent a similar role. Most importantly, the composition of the analysis group needs 
to include the relevant competence and ensure a sufficient degree of continuity (with 
respect to attendance of some of the participants) within the group. The four phases of 
the process include: 1: Context establishment; 2: Risk identification and modelling; 3: Risk 
model validation; and 4: Follow-up. 
The objective of Phase 1 is to characterize the scope and the target of the analysis. 
Stakeholders that the analysis is being performed on behalf of, time perspective, rele-
vant terminology, assumptions, roles and participants of the analysis group, as well as 
the information sources, are specified. Assets, that is the values that will drive the focus 
of the analysis, are also defined. This phase produces descriptions, insights and a com-
mon understanding of the target of analysis. The target of the analysis is, moreover, 
specified and modelled with respect to capabilities, structure, dataflow, workflow, etc. 
The existing target specifications (i.e. those which are available prior to the analysis) 
may be reused or referred to.  
 The objective of Phase 2 is to identify the relevant risk model elements and develop 
a risk model. The risk model elements may be of the following types: assets, vulnera-
bilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents. The unwanted incidents are the ele-
ments that may harm the assets (which are assumed to be specified during Phase 1). 
The very first step of this phase is to introduce the types of the model elements to the 
analysis group. A brief introduction to the modelling constructs and their simple expla-
nations is illustrated in Table 1. The explanations in the last column are simplified  
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wordings inspired by corresponding definitions from CORAS1. Thereafter, the identi-
fication of risks through a risk modelling activity using the constructs in Table 1, is 
initiated. The instantiated constructs are, as a part of this process, annotated with de-
scriptive text. The relationships between the instantiated model constructs are ex-
pressed with arcs connecting the relevant elements, thus resulting in a risk model 
shaped as an acyclic directed graph. The analyst shall facilitate the model development 
by iteratively posing questions on risks that may harm the assets and the possible vul-
nerabilities and threat scenarios that cause those risks. The analyst shall also contribute 
with cybersecurity domain knowledge during the risk modelling. The analyst shall, 
moreover, ensure that the syntax of the risk model is consistent. The domain experts 
shall, during the risk modelling, contribute with the domain knowledge on power grids. 
Discussion is facilitated in order to align the different domains and reveal the relevant 
risks. At the same time, the context description from Phase 1 is actively used. Moreover, 
if needed, refined descriptions of selected model elements are provided. For some parts 
of the risk model, it may be appropriate to express uncertainties and assumptions, in 
form of supplementary information or within the model. 
 Phase 3 aims at validating the risk model developed in the preceding phase. That is, 
the model should be exposed to quality assurance based on various and complementing 
kinds of empirical input, in order to ensure an acceptable level of uncertainty. The un-
certainty may origin from insufficient information or knowledge, or from variability in 
context, usage, etc. This is followed by adjustments of the model with respect to the 
structure and the individual elements. Eventually, the model is approved if the evalua-
tion shows that the revised version is sufficiently complete, correct and certain. 
 The objective of Phase 4 is two-fold, namely communication and maintenance of the 
results. The specific tasks of this phase include summary of most critical findings, eval-
uations of validity and reliability of the risk model, recommendations of risk treatments, 
summary of uncertainties in the findings, as well as communications of the results to 
the relevant stakeholders. Maintenance of the risk model involves monitoring of as-
sumptions and the context changes that may require updates of the risk model.   
 
1 Note that the definition of vulnerability from the energy sector is slightly different, namely 
"Vulnerability is an expression for the problems a system faces to maintain its function if a 
threat leads to an unwanted event and the problems the system faces to resume its activities 
after the event occurred. Vulnerability is an internal characteristic of the system" [15]. 
Table 1. Constructs of the cybersecurity risk modelling language. 
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4 Trial of the Approach on an Industry Pilot on Future Digital 
Substations  
This section outlines the process undergone during the industrial case, as well as the 
main properties of the risk model produced. We also summarize the lessons learned.  
4.1 Setting of the Case Study  
By the introduction of digital secondary substations new sensors and communication 
technologies provide new measurements and remotely controlled disconnectors in the 
medium voltage (MV) (1-35 kV) distribution grid. As a result, the digitalization of the 
secondary substation gives new possibilities for smarter operation and fault- and inter-
ruption handling. At the same time these technologies introduce new vulnerabilities to 
the system. To study these vulnerabilities a case study has been performed together 
with a Norwegian grid company, in order to study 31 digital secondary substations they 
own in the south-western part of Norway.  
Digital Secondary Substations. The electrical energy must be transported from the 
power generators to the consumers. On the way, electric power may flow through sev-
eral substations being transformed between different voltage levels. The secondary sub-
stations are the interconnection between the MV and low voltage (LV) distribution grid 
levels. A digital secondary substation is typically described as an electrical substation 
where operation is managed between distributed intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) 
which are interconnected by the communication network. In this specific case study, 
the secondary substations (31 in total) are equipped slightly differently, but with a lot 
of common functionality. The first digital secondary substation was commissioned in 
2016 and the last one within this pilot, was commissioned in 2019. All 31 secondary 
substations are equipped with remotely controlled disconnectors at all incoming and 
outgoing cables. Every cable has also a fault current indicator, annotated with green 
circles in Figure 2, that detects both short-circuit fault and earth-fault, and communi-
cates directly to the SCADA-system via remote terminal unit (RTU). For the transform-
ers in the secondary substation, sensors are installed to monitor the oil pressure, the oil 
level and the transformer temperature, as indicated within the blue box in Figure 2. On 
the LV side of the secondary substation, indicated with orange color in Figure 2, power 
analyzers are installed to measure current, voltage, active/reactive power and earth 
fault. In addition, sensors are installed on the doors to detect whether the door is closed 
or open, and temperature sensors are installed to measure the room temperature within 
the substation building. Monitoring of the arc arrester and detection of the SF-6 pressure 
is, moreover, installed.  
The different sensors placed in the digital secondary substation transfer the follow-
ing parameters to the SCADA system in real-time through secured and encrypted fiber 
network: temperature (room and transformer); frequency, line voltages; phase voltages, 
total harmonic distortion (THD) voltages; currents; THD currents; active power (P), 
reactive power (Q) and apparent power (S); power factor.  
Scope of the analysis. The stakeholder of this risk analysis has been the DSO, own-
ing the 31 digital secondary substations. Their concern is the company reputation, their  
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Figure 2. A sketch of the digital secondary substation indicating the different types of sen-
sors and technologies installed.  
income (economy), as well as Environment, Health and Safety (EHS). The scope of the 
analysis has been to protect the asset; the reliability of supply of the electric power 
system, defined as: "probability that an electric power system can perform a required 
function under given conditions for a given time interval." (IEV 617-01-01) [12]. This 
asset may be affected (positively or negatively) by digitizing the secondary substation. 
On the positive side, the sensors will give warnings for instance of increasing trans-
former temperature, which may trigger desired maintenance and avoid transformer 
damage. For instance, a fault current indicator functioning correctly will contribute to 
localizing the fault faster which will reduce the fault localization time and by that the 
interruption time and cost. On the other hand, wrong signals from the sensors may lead 
to wrong decisions, and in worst case lead to longer interruption duration. In addition, 
remotely controlled disconnectors may potentially be opened by an attacker, and lead 
to interruption for all customers behind that substation. By adding all these sensors, the 
system becomes more complex and the consequences of the critical events may in-
crease, while the introduction of the ICT-support decreases the consequences of the 
frequent events [7].    
The scope of the analysis comprised all systems and subsystems starting from the 
front-end at the SCADA-systems and until the LV-side of the secondary substation. 
The infrastructure for the smart meters and the SCADA-system itself, are outside of the 
scope. The focus was on the parts within the yellow rectangle in Figure 3. The figure 
was developed during the context establishment and was later actively used during the 
analysis. The frontends are the parts of the SCADA-system which have two-ways com-
munication with all digital secondary substation. The communication link (indicated 
with red lines) involves firewalls and routers. It uses encryption before sending the 
information over public fiber network. The routers and the firewalls are duplicated on 
the SCADA side of the communication link. At the secondary substation, the signals 
are received by a router which contains an access list. The RTU is the receiver of the 
information from the SCADA-system. In addition, the RTU is the unit collecting all 
data from the sensors within the substation. The secondary substations have battery 
back-up (24 V), which can, in case of interruptions, supply the required power to the 
RTU and the sensors. 
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Figure 3. Sketch of what is within and outside of the analysis. The yellow rectangle shows 
the boundaries of what is inside the analysis.  
Assumptions and delimitation of the industrial case. The following assumptions 
were made in the case study as part of context establishment: 
• The SCADA system is outside of the scope of this analysis (as indicated in Figure 3). 
• The smart meters (installed at all end-users in Norway from 1st of January 2019) and the 
belonging infrastructure are outside of the scope. 
• Physical security of the secondary substation and human safety are outside of scope of this 
analysis. 
• The purpose has been to carry out a qualitative risk assessment of the digital secondary 
substation, no quantification has been done. 
• The focus is on the 31 secondary substations in south-eastern part of Norway. Any possible 
additional consequences resulting from an increased number of digitalized secondary sub-
stations, are not a part of the analysis.  
The main focus has been on the new vulnerabilities and threats introduced by installing 
the new technology and sensors, especially with establishing the communication link 
between the SCADA-system and the disconnectors at all secondary substations. Cyber-
security, specifically related to the communication infrastructure, is of particular im-
portance. The exclusion of the SCADA system and the smart meters from the scope 
was a deliberate choice, as primarily the risks introduced by the particularities and new 
aspects of this specific case study, were focused on.  
Background of the participants involved in the analysis. The analysis was per-
formed with a core team of seven people. The risk analysis was performed by one ana-
lyst, PhD, with about 16 years of experience in software engineering and cybersecurity 
risk management, and two domain experts with 6-18 years of relevant experience 
within power system reliability and security of electricity supply. These three partici-
pants are affiliated with the research institute. From the grid company a six people in 
total have been involved in this analysis. The main contributions have been given by a 
core group consisting of four people; one manager and three domain experts. The three 
domain experts have the following expertise area; one is a network communication ex-
pert; one is a SCADA system expert and one is an information security expert. They 
each have more than 20 years of experience in their fields. Two additional experts from 
the grid company participated only in the validation workshop; one expert in planning 
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of the digital secondary substation and the other expert in risk analysis. These two had 
not been a part of this analysis before and gave useful input in the validation phase. 
4.2 Process Outline  
The case study was conducted between November 2018 and March 2019, in the form 
of eight videoconference meetings and one physical meeting. The setting was fully re-
alistic in terms of the context specified, the process undergone, the risk model that was 
developed, and the participants that were involved. The cybersecurity risks of the sec-
ondary digital substations pilot were identified and modelled, with respect to the estab-
lished context. The case study included trial of primarily the first three phases of the 
approach presented in Section 3.  
Table 2 summarizes the process undergone. For each workshop, we list the meeting 
number, the date, the participants, the meeting type, the meeting length, and the activi-
ties which were conducted. Unless otherwise specified, the mentioned activities were 
conducted during the meeting. 
Table 2. The process conducted during the case study. 
Meeting number: 1; Date: 21.11.2018; Participants: analyst, 1 domain expert from the 
grid company, and one from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; 
Meeting type: video; Duration: 1,5h; Activities: Establishment of context, goals, scope and 
focus for the case study. 
Meeting number: 2; Date: 22.11.2018; Participants:  analyst, 2 domain experts from the 
research institute; Meeting type: video; Duration: 1h; Activities: An introduction to the 
digital secondary substations and their role in the power grid was given by the domain 
experts to the analyst. 
Meeting number: 3; Date: 10.12.2018; Participants:  analyst, one domain expert from the 
grid company and one from the research institute; Meeting type: video; Duration:  1.5h; 
Activities: Further clarifications of the context.  
Meeting no. 4; Date: 12.12.2018; Participants:  analyst, three domain experts from the grid 
company and one from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; Meeting 
type: video; Duration: 2 h; Activities. Further clarifications of the context. High level 
cybersecurity risk analysis. 
Meeting number: 5; Date: 17.12.2018; Participants:  analyst, three domain experts from 
the grid company and one from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; 
Meeting type: video; Duration: 2h; Activities: Terminology clarifications. Cybersecurity 
risk modelling, based on the context and the high level risk analysis.  
Meeting number: 6; Date: 21.01.2019; Participants: analyst, three domain experts from 
the grid company and two from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; 
Meeting type: video; Duration: 3h; Activities prior to the meeting: the analyst updated 
the model remaining by covering the remaining aspects from the high-level analysis. 
Activities during the meeting: the analyst presented the new version of the model. 
Continued cybersecurity risk modelling. 
Meeting number: 7; Date: 20.02.2019; Participants:  analyst, three domain experts from 
the grid company and two from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; 
Meeting type: video; Duration: 2h; Activities prior to the meeting: the analyst updated the 
model with the relevant contents and the grid company had an internal walkthrough of the 
results. Activities during the meeting: the analyst presented the new version of the model. 
Continued cybersecurity risk modelling. 
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Meeting number: 8; Date: 06.03.2019; Participants:  analyst, one domain expert from the 
grid company and two from the research institute, the manager from the grid company; 
Meeting type: video; Duration: 1.5h; Activities prior to the meeting: the analyst retrieved 
the ENISA IoT tool [6], processed the contents and annotated potentially relevant parts. The 
list was then processed by the domain experts from the grid company and the relevant parts 
were extracted. The risk model was then updated by the analyst and sent to the analysis team. 
The grid company prepared a set of scenarios (based on an independent earlier risk analysis) 
to be used for validation of the risk model. Activities during the meeting: the analyst 
presented the new version of the model. Continued cybersecurity risk modelling. A brief intro 
by the analyst to the ENISA IoT tool and a proposal to process it in order to complement the 
model with any missing aspects mentioned by the tool. 
Meeting number: 9; Date: 11.03.2019; Participants:  analyst, five domain experts from the 
grid company, the manager from the grid company; Meeting type: physical; Duration: 4h; 
Activities prior to the meeting: the analyst retrieved the ENISA IoT tool, processed the 
contents and annotated potentially relevant parts. The list was then processed by the domain 
experts from the grid company and the relevant parts were extracted. The risk model was then 
updated by the analyst and sent to the analysis team. The grid company prepared a set of 19 
risk elements and 9 scenarios (based on an independent earlier risk analysis of digitalized 
secondary substations) to be used for validation of the risk model.  Activities during the 
meeting: Validation of the risk model. The analyst first presented the updated model. 
Thereafter, each one of the scenarios were gone through and a check was made as to whether 
the contents were already represented by the model. During the processing of the risk elements 
against the risk model, five vulnerabilities were added – three of them were triggered by one 
risk element each, and two were triggered by a fourth risk element. During the processing of 
the nine scenarios, a minor model update was made for the first scenario, no updates were 
needed for the second and the third scenario, the fourth scenario was found to be outside the 
scope, one vulnerability was added to the model due to the fifth scenario, no changes were 
needed due to the sixth scenario, one vulnerability was added to the model due to the seventh 
scenario, no changes were needed due to the eighth scenario, and three vulnerabilities were 
added to the model due to the seventh scenario. 
4.3 Results from the Case Study  
A high-level view of the risk model obtained from the above summarized process, is 
shown on Figure 4. The figure indicates the size of the final model, and reports on some 
of the contents. Selected parts of the model (i.e. those model elements that miss a textual 
annotation) are, for confidentiality reasons, undisclosed. The disclosed details on the 
figure include a representative selection of the specific vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, 
the one unwanted incident and the asset, in order to illustrate the abstraction level and 
the relationships among the elements. 
The risk model shown on Figure 4 contains 14 undisclosed threat scenarios (TS_01 
– TS_14) and 10 disclosed ones, one unwanted incident which is disclosed, and one 
direct asset which is disclosed. Most of the vulnerabilities are undisclosed and only 
annotated by a numerical value. The numbers associated with the many vulnerability 
symbols represent the number of distinct anonymized vulnerabilities in the actual 
model that lead to the specified threat scenarios. For example, one vulnerability is an-
notated with the digit 18 and leads to the threat scenario "Insufficient security of 
SCADA or DMS". This conveys that there are eighteen different vulnerabilities that in 
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our final risk model lead to this threat scenario. Moreover, there are, for instance, two 
distinct vulnerabilities which in our final risk model lead to both threat scenarios TS_10 
and TS_11. 
 
Figure 4. High level view of the risk model. TS means Threat Scenario. The numbers under-
neath some of the vulnerabilities indicate the number of the distinct vulnerabilities present in the 
indicated parts of the model. 
4.4 Experiences and Lessons Learned  
Upon having completed meeting 5, the grid company wrote a feedback (without any 
prior request from group members) expressing that the workshop gave a good impres-
sion, and that the systematic approach and the graphical representation of the risk 
model, were appreciated. The second feedback was requested and received upon com-
pletion of the case study. The message was: "The process was useful and good. We 
were not a priori familiar with the approach applied, in particular not with the modelling 
approach. In addition to the improved competence on methodology for risk analysis, 
the work will be carried on and used as a baseline for another (specifically named) 
innovation project." 
The group agreed that a thorough understanding of the context is crucial. In fact, a 
deep understanding of the digital secondary substations was gained by all analysis par-
ticipants including the analyst, which also enabled the analyst to actively participate in 
risk modelling and development of the preliminary model. Such a deep insight into the 
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domain is not assumed by the approach, but it was in our case experienced as an enabler 
of a better progress of the analysis.  
Like in the previous trial of the approach, we have observed that regardless of how 
well the security risk analyst understands the context, it is crucial that the analyst does 
not develop the risk models alone. Risk identification triggers namely many useful dis-
cussions among the analysis participants, and it helps reveal knowledge, risks, incon-
sistencies and misunderstandings. Such information is crucial for validity of the risk 
model.  
None of the domain experts from the grid company had prior experiences in either 
CORAS or graphical risk modelling in general. Still, the risk model was gradually up-
dated into new versions through iterative and thorough discussions among all the par-
ticipants. Our observation is that an adequate level of abstraction was selected, in terms 
of both the resulting size of the model and the level of detail provided. An important 
property of the risk model was that it was possible to express all information into one 
merged model, so that the complexity and the relevant relationships were explicitly 
reflected in a single comprehensive overview.  
5 Discussion 
Based on the results presented in Section 4, we discuss and evaluate the fulfilment of 
the requirements defined in Section 1. The second part of this section discusses the 
main threats to validity and reliability of the results.  
5.1 To What Degree are the Requirements Fulfilled?  
Requirement 1. To fully justify this requirement, we would have to quantify the ben-
efits, as well as the costs. We have not attempted to do so. However, the feedback which 
has been received and the experiences gained, at least partially, indicate that the benefit 
justifies the effort, meaning that our customized approach is reasonably cost effective 
as well as light-weight. Moreover, our approach does not comprise risk estimation, 
evaluation and treatment, which are activities that many full-scale risk analysis methods 
include. This saved significant effort, although benefits of such activities were not re-
alized either. 
Requirement 2. As previously mentioned, the participants had rather varying back-
ground. Still, after a brief introduction of the approach, they were quickly able to ac-
tively contribute to the model development. Moreover, their involvement during the 
process demonstrated comprehensibility of the modelling approach. 
Requirement 3. We were able to express all cybersecurity relevant risk elements 
and their mutual dependencies that were identified during the process.  This suggests 
that our risk modelling approach has the expressiveness needed to capture relevant as-
pects of the cybersecurity risk picture in the context of smart power grids. 
Requirement 4. As previously mentioned, smart grid concepts and technologies are 
still relatively immature, as they have not been in operation for a significantly long 
time. Thus, there is little experience on possible cyber risk incidents and their conse-
quences for power system. Our approach has therefore deliberately been designed with 
simplicity as a goal, and with focus on vulnerabilities instead of the incidents. In the 
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context of this case study, no unavailable information or details of unrealistic precision 
were demanded by the approach. In cases where such contents were possible and de-
sired to include, the model was capable of adopting them. The analysis group was there-
fore free to choose the level of granularity in the risk model which is appropriate for 
expressing the information available. 
Requirement 5. The final risk model included the high-level risk picture overview 
for the whole context. The needed details, such as decomposed vulnerabilities as well 
as dependencies among the model elements, were also explicitly expressed within the 
same model. This suggests scalability of the modelling approach in terms of both the 
ability to address a broad scope and to detail the necessary parts of it. Given its size, 
our model was readable when printed on a poster of A0-format.   
5.2 Threats to Validity and Reliability  
The results of the trial indicate feasibility of applying the approach. We have observed 
and received feedback suggesting that new knowledge about the target of analysis and 
its security risks was gained, which may suggest usefulness of the approach. However, 
application of the approach on a specific case such as digital secondary substations has 
clear limitations in terms of representativeness of the target of the analysis for the aimed 
smart grid domain. A generalization of the results is therefore not yet possible. For that, 
far more empirical evidence and multiple trials are needed. 
The brainstorming-driven approach to risk modelling which significantly relies on 
the domain-expert knowledge is a threat in itself, due to the limited structure. Under 
such circumstances, the ability to ensure that all possible risk model elements have been 
considered, is limited. The validation step of the approach is therefore crucial.  
The validation phase showed that several updates of the model were needed, upon 
exposure of the model to the independently retrieved risk scenario. Also, the use of the 
ENISA IoT tool triggered significant number of updates in terms of new model ele-
ments. All these steps were performed during some of the final meetings. Hence, we 
have no evidence that additional empirical sources would not have involved new 
changes in the risk model. This clearly represents a threat to reliability and validity.  
A retrospective evaluation of the model with respect to historical risks would have 
been of interest, but the industry pilot has not been running for long enough in order to 
have sufficient empirical baseline. The fact that the analysis group was composed of 
experienced domain experts, did most likely balance this and contribute to validity of 
the input. It should be mentioned that the analyst from this case study had a main role 
in the original design of the customized version of the approach. This may represent a 
threat to validity of the evaluation of performance of the approach with respect to the 
five requirements (in Section 5.1). As such, it is also a threat to reliability of the evalu-
ation results, as we cannot know to what degree another analysis group, without pres-
ence of the approach designer, would have obtained the same results. 
The follow-up phase of the approach was not tried out, thus leaving another uncer-
tainty in the evaluation. We did, however, show that the model is relatively easy to 
modify, as well as that if facilitates communication of the risk picture.  
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6 Conclusions and Future Work  
This paper reports on the results of applying an earlier proposed approach to cyberse-
curity risk identification and modelling, on a pilot on digital secondary substations. The 
trial was conducted in a fully realistic setting, in the form of an industrial case study, in 
close collaboration with a major Norwegian distribution system operator. We argue that 
our approach to some extent fulfils the five pre-identified requirements and the results 
do indicate feasibility and usefulness of the approach. However, there are at the same 
time, clear limitations in terms of reliability and validity of the results.  
The next step will be to perform a postmortem evaluation of both this case study, as 
well as the previous one that addressed the self-healing pilot. The two case studies as 
well as their respective postmortems will then be cross-analyzed in order to progress 
the evaluation. Another next step is to develop specific recommendations, templates 
and guidelines for cybersecurity risk identification in the smart grid domain, based on 
our approach.  
For future studies it would be of interest also to investigate 1) the importance and 
possible increased risk (possible single points of failure) related to installing similar 
equipment in many secondary substations versus the increased complexity and possible 
interoperability issues if different equipment is selected and 2) the impact on the power 
distribution system from increased penetration of digital secondary substations (e.g. 
possible propagation of failure).  
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